Beyond the Cult of Personality: The Permanent (?) Power of the RSS

Source: https://www.rammadhav.in/articles/rss-at-100/

It is a pervasive error in contemporary Indian political analysis: we remain fixated on the visible political face—the individual leader, the electoral cycle, the current party manifesto. So for example, we tend to concentrate on Modi or for that matter Mamata and not the people who work behind the scene. For Modi, this is much more important, as he is an ultimate product of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) - an unparalle ideological organisiton that now shapes much of Indian landscape. To truly understand the long game being played out in India's democracy, we must tear our eyes away from the political stage and focus on the organizational depth and ideological engine that provides the actual governing blueprint: the RSS.

The prevailing narrative often treats the Sangh Parivar as synonymous with its political instrument, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). This conflation is a mistake that dangerously underestimates the durability and systemic nature of the Hindutva project. As noted political scientists, including Walter Andersen and Shridhar Damle, have long argued, the RSS is not merely a volunteer wing or a think-tank; it is best understood as a "super-party" or a parallel institutional structure, acting as a shadow state operating outside the bounds of constitutional accountability. Its longevity and influence are entirely independent of who happens to be the Prime Minister this decade. The true source of RSS power is not charisma, but cadre and routine.

The Engine of Obedience: Shakhas and Pracharaks

The Sangh’s operational genius lies in its dual structure of the shakha (the daily branch meeting) and the pracharak (the full-time missionary). While the political theatre captures headlines, over 70,000 daily shakhas are quietly operating, functioning as decentralized ideological cells. These aren't political rallies; they are sites of 'character-building'—physical drills, ideological indoctrination, and the constant cultivation of a homogeneous, masculine Hindu Rashtra consciousness. This grassroots discipline ensures that the movement is rooted in daily life, not just five-yearly elections. It is here, in the physical commitment and ideological repetition, that the deep, long-term conditioning of the swayamsevak (volunteer) takes place.

More critical still is the Pracharak system. These are men who commit their lives—often practicing celibacy and renouncing family and professional life—to the organisation's cause [Andersen & Damle, 2019]. They are the highly dedicated, ideologically indoctrinated, full-time staff who are seamlessly deployed across all sectors: politics, labour, education, and civil society - you name it RSS has it.

When a political wing needs leadership, it is the pracharak system that furnishes the cadre. From district-level organisers to Chief Ministers and even the Prime Minister, many of the BJP's most effective politicians are simply pracharaks reassigned to a political mission. This one-way street—where the RSS lends its human capital to the BJP—underscores the relationship: the political party is an instrument, and the organisation is the permanent master.

The Real Command Structure

The command centre of the Sangh does not sit in the Prime Minister's Office in New Delhi; it resides in the Sarsanghchalak's office in Nagpur. The Prime Minister is an elected official, accountable to the Constitution and the voters. The Sarsanghchalak (Chief) is the ideological and spiritual guide, appointed for life, without accountability to any democratic process. The transfer of power within the RSS—by nomination from the predecessor—guarantees absolute ideological continuity and protects the core mission from popular political volatility.

The executive head of the RSS is the Sarkaryavah (General Secretary), who is elected by the Akhil Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha (ABPS). This operational leadership is the true nerve center that coordinates the sprawling web of the Sangh Parivar. It is this figure, working closely with the Sarsanghchalak, who dictates the direction and sets the priorities for the entire network—including the political wing.

Political scientists have long referred to the RSS as a "super-party" or "state within the state" precisely because of this structure. It can hold its political affiliate accountable, veto key policy positions, or, if necessary, orchestrate a leadership change within the BJP itself to protect the sanctity of the broader Hindutva mission. The politician is replaceable; the system is not.

Penetration, Not Just electoral Victory. The greatest measure of RSS success is not the number of seats the BJP wins, but the depth of its penetration into everyday society and cultural practices.

The Sangh Parivar is a constellation of nevery fully known number of affiliating organisations —from the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) in religion and the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS) in labour to Vidya Bharati in education. In addition to that, they have hundreds of NGOs. These organisations function as ideological foot soldiers, embedding the core message into every segment of society where direct political intervention would fail.

Therefore, even if the BJP were to suffer a debilitating electoral defeat tomorrow, this network would not vanish. The teachers in Vidya Bharati schools would still teach an RSS-approved version of history; the local shakhas would still run daily; the cultural narrative of "Hindu victimhood" would still be championed by the VHP. The political victory merely provides the opportunity to accelerate the mission; the organisation is the engine that keeps it running permanently.

To look at India’s political landscape through the narrow lens of election results is to willfully ignore the monumental organisational effort that has been underway since 1925. The challenge to secular, constitutional democracy is not rooted in the ephemeral popularity of a single leader, but in the permanent, dedicated structure of the RSS. Until this distinction is clearly understood, analysts and opposition parties alike will continue to confuse the political instrument with the ideological master. The greatest threat is not a powerful politician, but the indestructible organisation behind them.

Having said that, it is equally important to understand that the increasing reliance of RSS and a rising public perception that equates BJP’s success with Modi-Shah duo can be counterproductive. So, if any decision made by them becomes unsuccessful or brings damage to the party, it would then be attributed to RSS’s failure. This centralising tendency bears the risk that India has witnessed before during Indira Regime. 

Dictatorship as Culture: An Anthropological View of Indira Gandhi and Narendra Modi

 

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Dictatorship as Culture: An Anthropological View of Indira Gandhi and Narendra Modi 

Suman Nath

Fifty years ago, on June 25, 1975, Indira Gandhi imposed a state of Emergency that suspended democracy in India. Half a century later, India is again grappling with concerns over democratic backsliding—this time, without a formal declaration. Though separated by time, political ideology, and context, both Indira Gandhi and Narendra Modi exemplify how power can centralize, calcify, and capture the state’s moral and institutional machinery. But to truly understand what’s at stake, we must look beyond law books and parliamentary debates.

Anthropology, with its emphasis on cultural relativism and diversity, offers a valuable perspective. As Ruth Benedict once wrote, “The purpose of anthropology is to make the world safe for human differences.” In studying power, anthropologists remind us that politics is also performance—full of symbols, bodies, rituals, and ideas that go far beyond policy.

The Emergency: Spectacle of State Power

Indira Gandhi’s Emergency (1975–1977) was India's most overt encounter with authoritarianism. Civil liberties were suspended, the press muzzled, and over 100,000 political opponents jailed. Justifications ranged from “internal disturbance” to vague threats to national stability (Britannica). But beneath the legal rationale lay a cultural script: Gandhi, as Nehru’s daughter, invoked a dynastic charisma that Max Weber might call charismatic authority (Weber, 1947).

What unfolded was more than just political repression. It was a social drama—an authoritarian performance. Gandhi’s shift from being labeled a “goongi goodiya” (dumb doll) to being perceived as the nation’s stern matriarch reveals how power in India often assumes familial and mythic forms.

Nowhere was this performance more disturbing than in the forced sterilization campaigns led by her son, Sanjay Gandhi. Over 11 million people—most of them poor—were sterilized, often forcibly (India Today). It was biopolitical violence at scale: the state not only governed people’s rights but their reproductive capacities too. As Michel Foucault suggested, modern states often govern not by killing but by controlling how people live and reproduce. Here, the state attempted to reshape society by disciplining the very bodies of its citizens.

Modi’s India: Emergency Without a Name?

Narendra Modi has not declared an Emergency—but many argue that his regime is marked by a subtler, more pervasive authoritarianism. Ramachandra Guha, among others, has claimed that Modi’s government may be even more dangerous than Gandhi’s because it slowly erodes democratic institutions while maintaining the appearance of legality (Scroll.in; The Diplomat).

Modi’s rise is an anthropological masterclass in populist performance. From humble tea-seller to national messiah, his story is carefully curated. His persona is omnipresent—on posters, in radio broadcasts, in social media videos—and increasingly indistinguishable from the nation itself (IJFMR). But the real shift under Modi is ideological: where Gandhi used the state to centralize authority within a secular framework, Modi uses Hindu nationalism—or Hindutva—as a cultural glue to justify majoritarianism.

This form of nationalism redefines who belongs where. Through policies like the Citizenship Amendment Act and narratives like "love jihad," the state no longer imagines citizenship in inclusive terms. It constructs the “true Indian” as a Hindu, Hindi-speaking, culturally conservative man—effectively excluding vast swathes of the country (Telegraph India).

Where Gandhi repressed through censorship and arrests, Modi’s regime uses a blend of soft power and intimidation. The press may not be officially censored, but media houses often toe the line. Protest is not illegal, but activists are routinely arrested. The result is a kind of “normalized exception”—a state where democratic norms are hollowed out from within, as political scientist Giorgio Agamben theorized ([Appadurai, 2006]; [Agamben, 2005]).

Anthropology and the Price of Uniformity

What both Gandhi and Modi illustrate is that authoritarianism in India is not merely legal—it is cultural. Both leaders drew upon deeply ingrained symbols: the mother figure, the religious redeemer, the masculine protector. Anthropology forces us to ask: what makes these performances resonate? Why are Indians so often drawn to strong, central figures who promise order, unity, and destiny?

But anthropology also warns us: the cost of such unity is often the suppression of diversity. Clifford Geertz famously wrote that humans live through “webs of significance” they spin themselves. These webs—cultural, linguistic, religious—are what make India vibrant. Centralized power, particularly when culturally majoritarian, tears through these webs, reducing a rich mosaic to a monochrome portrait.

Indira Gandhi’s Emergency, for all its repression, did not attempt to redefine national identity in ethno-religious terms. Modi’s project does. It is not just about governance but about who belongs. That makes his version of authoritarianism more deeply cultural—and perhaps more enduring.

Resistance: Then and Now

During the Emergency, resistance went underground: students, activists, and journalists operated in secrecy, relying on typewriters and pamphlets. Today, resistance lives online and on the streets. From Shaheen Bagh to the farmers’ protests, new cultural scripts of defiance are being written. Art, song, slogans, hashtags—these are the tools of dissent in Modi’s India.

But resistance, like power, is performed. The state now deploys surveillance, digital propaganda, and legal instruments to suppress opposition. Sedition laws are back in vogue. Yet, people continue to speak, often at great risk. In doing so, they preserve not just democracy, but cultural freedom.

The Real Lesson of 50 Years

As we mark 50 years since the Emergency, we must ask: what does authoritarianism look like today? It may not come with tanks in the streets or midnight knocks. It may come with prime-time news, devotional apps, and carefully curated nationalism.

Anthropology teaches us that politics is not just law—it is life, lived through rituals, identities, and beliefs. If we truly want to protect democracy in India, we must also protect diversity, not just as a constitutional value, but as a cultural necessity.

Because when power demands uniformity, anthropology reminds us of a simple truth: democracy thrives not on sameness, but on difference.

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The author is a political anthropologist and teaches anthropology in Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam Government College, Kolkata

References

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From Violence to Silence: The Curious Case of Bhatpara, West Bengal by Suman Nath

 

West Bengal has developed several communally charged hotspots since 2015. Aggressive Ram Navami rallies are the primary mechanisms for the Hindutva organisations to cultivate the Hindutva sentiments in these regions. Kankinara-Bhatpara region of North 24 parganas district is one of such places. While the conflict started as early as 2017 when the collective of Hindutva organisations under RSS brought out a Ram Navami rally. The communal ambiance was quickly handled because of prompt police action. In 2018 there was a large-scale riot between the Hindus and Muslims that resulted in death of several civilians and the sub-urban railway network was interrupted for weeks. The local Member of Assembly Mr. Arjun Singh's change of political affiliation from Trinamool Congress to Bharatiya Janta Party added further vibrance to the ethno-political landscape of the region. Hurling of bombs, sound of gunshot and regular conflicts kept Bengali newspapers busy reporting Bhatpara. Aamra ek sachetan Prayas forum, an organisation which studies conflict and peace in India, did a comprehensive study on the nature of conflicts and published a ground report (https://aamrabharatbarsha.com/welcome/singlepost/bhatpara-violence-fact-finding-report) which shows a mix of local politics and declining jute industries to be the prime mover of Bhatpara becoming a communal hotbed. Aamra has formed a peace centre among the riot victims in Bhatpara to bring about positive changes there, especially among the children. Because of several communal incidents, Bhatpara has been a focus of attention during the Ram temple inauguration on January 22, 2024. Contrary to what Bhatpara has experience since 2018, it was rather peaceful. It is important to understand the factors that brought back peace in an otherwise hotbed of communally charged landscape.

 
The setting:

 

Bhatpara is located on the eastern bank of river hooghly, it belongs to one of the places where jute industries were established during the British period which flourished enough to attract workers from different corners of the country (https://www.jstor.org/stable/20078659). They were then settled in the prosperous labour colonies and officers quarters (https://www.jstor.org/stable/141708). With the steady decline of Jute industry once prosperous colonies have become shanties (https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315098975-9/mill-sirens-rang-danger-anna-sailer). A journey through the river touching places like Kankinara-Bhatpara, Telinipara, Naihati would show series of jute mills and related labour colonies. The labour colony settlers have been here for three to five generations. Although, they have settled down in West Bengal, forming shanty campuses, these places have never assimilated with dominant Bengali language and customs. They speak Hindi or Urdu and are able to cling to their traditional customs and rituals. Their interface with Bengali speaking people has been of peaceful and tolerant.

 

In my ethnographic research at post-riot Bhatpara, I have found out rather natural co-existence between Hindus and Muslims. While the labour colonies have become ghettoised, as the next generation settlers have constructed shanties beside the existing labour quarters, there is hardly any option to avoid everyday physical contact between Hindus and Muslims. The adjacent makeshift shanties inhabited by Hindus and Muslims have co-operated each others in their everyday life ranging from food sharing to handling a nagging kid. The community latrines and common bathing place have added to such interdependence. I found that a small open space in Tina-gudam area was being used by both Hindus and Muslims everyday. While there was a large cut-out of lord Ram, Muslims were preparing for the celebration of Eid at the same ground. Yet, 2018 onwards a deep division between the Hindus and Muslims characterised this place (https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9781003273516-6/fundamentalists-meet-suman-nath). There were even reports of kids of different faiths sitting separately in local schools. In 2020, just opposite side of Hooghly, another riot broke in Telinipara-Chandannagar which made this region even more prominent locale for the cultivation of communal sentiments (https://aamrabharatbarsha.com/welcome/singlepost/%E0%A6%A4%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%B2%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%A8%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%AA%E0%A6%BE%E0%A7%9C%E0%A6%BE-%E0%A6%A4%E0%A6%A5%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%AF%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%A8%E0%A7%81%E0%A6%B8%E0%A6%A8%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%A7%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%A8-%E0%A6%AA%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%B0%E0%A6%A4%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%AC%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%A6%E0%A6%A8-%E0%A7%A8%E0%A7%A6%E0%A7%A8%E0%A7%A6)

 

The political economy:

 

While in my book I wrote extensively on the political economic equation which existed in Bhatpara during Arjun Sing's switch over and the Mafia culture which predominated the area (https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003273516/democracy-social-cleavage-india-suman-nath?refId=8d19e283-3cba-4c4c-a6e1-f1de36cc8840&context=ubx), the situation has changed over the years. For now, controlling the labours, making more contractual labourers than the permanent ones is aided with land related business which involves promoting and buying and selling of lands for profits. Mr Sing's political adventure with BJP in 2019 when he won the Barrackpore Parliamentary constituency as a BJP candidate was not viable in local political economic equations. First of all, his Muslim support base was gone, Hindutva sentiment could only earn him a popular mandate against ruling TMC, but, such popular support was already with him since 2001. He won for four times in Bhatpara Assembly Constituency, hence, aggressive Hindutva didnt earn him any extra milege; secondly, his political-economic machinery couldn't operate like it used to be. The local police administration gone out of his control. Even his house was attacked more than once and even being a Member of Parliament he couldn't save his home from party goons (https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/kolkata/bjp-mp-arjun-singhs-house-in-west-bengal-attacked-with-crude-bombs-7495935/).

 

As Arjun Singh rejoined TMC in May 2022 (https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/kolkata/arjun-singh-joins-trinamool-congress-7930470/) thereby restoring the local political-economic equations once again. Meanwhile, some of his followers who were allegedly directly involved in the riots and have allegedly worked actively in dismantling some of the Muslim predominated labour colonies were also not in a position to work freely until the local political equation was settled down. Since 2022, slowly the tension between the two communities have reduced to a significant extent, which is directly connected to the political stability.

 

The deafening silence of the aggressive Hindutva:

 

Does this mean that the Hindutva brigade have gone to the backfoot? There has been a continuation and further proliferation of RSS run fitness camps, mock sword fight and not to forget the grand Ram Navami celebrations (https://www.ijcv.org/index.php/ijcv/article/view/3119). RSS has been successful to set the template for the politics in Bhatpara and its adjacent regions.

 

One recent example is the creation of 108 ft long ram portrait by the TMC leader Priyangu Pandey and his wife Jyoti Pandey (https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/kolkata/politics-religious-beliefs-different-things-tmc-man-who-made-108-ft-ram-portrait-9124780/). While Priyangu was internally scapegoated for 2018 Kankinara riot as he was involved in managing the TMC organised Ram Navami rally where Muslims were supposed to serve sharbat portraying Hindu-Muslim unity, post May 2022 he has emerged as a promising TMC leader with an ability to cater the rising demands of Hindutva. Another local TMC leader Gopal Raut, who was also allegedly involved in the riots have made a come back with popularity among both the Hindus and Muslims. On January 22, Both Priyangu and Gopal have organised camps for mass distribution of blankets to the poor. People belonging to both Hindu and Muslm communities have queued together when Grand Hindutva was celebrated by the BJP with firecrackers and lamps. Bhatpara region has seen several houses placing earthen lamps on the one hand and such queues were conspicuous on the other.

VHP organised programmes which were both less loud and smaller in scale; there was no use of DJ boxes with provocative aggressive Hindutva songs, which they played in 2018 both in Bhatpara and Asansol. The local police were also on high alert, shops were closed after 11:00 pm and local administration ensured that no crowed is formed in the night during the entire month of January 2024.

The relatively peaceful Bhatpara, shows the economic triumph over religious identity sentiments for the time being. It also indicates a strategic shift in approach of the Hindutva organisations at places like Bhatpara which has seen enough communal disturbances for more than five years now.

 

Suman Nath teaches anthropology at Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam Government College and is the author of the book “Democracy and Social Cleavage in India Ethnography of Riots, Everyday Politics and Communalism in West Bengal c. 2012–2021”