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From the Maoist-hit jungles of Junglemahal to the burning streets of riot-torn suburbs, West Bengal has been India’s laboratory of political violence for decades. But here’s the twist: it’s not just about politics. It’s about jobs. It’s about power. It’s about becoming someone in a world that offers little else.
Violence in Bengal doesn’t just erupt—it’s manufactured, curated, and circulated through what I call a “fluid machinery of violence.” And no, this isn't about random street fights. This is ethnographic evidence of how violence becomes an alternative career path, how thugs turn into protectors, and how democracy is gamed from the grassroots up.
For over 15 years, I’ve conducted multisite, longitudinal ethnographic research in some of Bengal’s most volatile districts. What I found is disturbing: the same people who once fought Maoists in tribal belts are now fighting Muslims in working-class towns. The faces change. The uniforms change. The script does not.
From Red Flags to Ram Navami: The Shapeshifting of Violence
In 2008, the forests of West Bengal were on fire—figuratively and literally. Armed Maoists were killing politicians, and the state retaliated with “village militias” like the Gram Shanti Raksha Bahini (Village Peace-Keeping Force). These vigilante groups were born out of fear but morphed into a formidable network of enforcers.
But the real shift came when these so-called protectors turned predators. Political camps set up to counter Maoists became violent nodes of state-backed militia. Young men, displaced or desperate, joined these camps for shelter, food, and a gun. By 2011, this spiral of violence exploded in Netai, where CPIM-linked gunmen fired indiscriminately on villagers, killing nine.
It was the end of one regime—and the birth of another.
Farming, Cold Storages, and the Economics of Fear
You thought agriculture was peaceful? Think again.
In places like Bardhaman, political violence is intricately linked to the rural economy. Cold storages, rice mills, and “potato bonds” (yes, they exist) are controlled by middlemen who owe their power to political parties. When the ruling party changes, so does the mafia.
Here, violence isn't ideological—it’s transactional. It decides who gets irrigation, who gets to sell potatoes, and who gets beaten up for supporting the “wrong” party. It’s a mafia-like oligarchy, and each tier—from investors to local goons—has a role.
So, when we say "free market" in rural Bengal, it's not just about prices. It's about muscle.
Ram Navami, Muharram, and the Rise of Identity Wars
Since 2013, another form of violence has surged—low-intensity communal riots. From Canning and Kaliachak to Chandannagar and Asansol, Bengal has seen increasing skirmishes during Hindu and Muslim festivals.
What’s different now is the scripted spontaneity. Whether it's a Facebook post or a procession route dispute, the spark is almost always lit in a deeply polarized, misinformation-laden public sphere. And who fans the flame? Professional goons, local party cadres, and politically connected businesspeople.
These aren’t accidental mobs. They’re actors in a well-rehearsed drama where Ram Navami sword rallies and Islamic Jalsas serve as political theatre.
Anatomy of a Riot: The Four-Layered Pyramid of Violence
What makes these incidents more than just “law and order” failures is the structure behind them. Based on my fieldwork, political violence in Bengal operates through a four-tiered machinery:
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Core Group: Mid-level political leaders and economic elites who plan the violence.
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Professionals: Hired muscle—willing to switch sides if the price is right.
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Opportunists: Local party workers who loot and burn for reward or recognition.
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The Public Sphere: Regular citizens radicalized through social media and community whispers.
These layers are porous and constantly in flux. Today’s volunteer becomes tomorrow’s leader. Yesterday’s criminal becomes today’s hero.
Violence as a Job, a Role, a Performance
The most alarming discovery from my research? Violence has become a career path. In areas with few employment opportunities, becoming a party tough or a religious enforcer is not just tolerated—it’s respected.
They are the local dadas, the ones who “get things done.” And in the absence of formal authority, they become the law.
In this sense, West Bengal doesn’t just have political violence—it has institutionalized violence. And it's not unique. As studies in South Asia show, from Bangladesh’s student riots to India’s communal clashes, violence increasingly functions as a resource strategy rather than an ideological war (Michelutti et al., 2019).
Why It Matters for India’s Democracy
If you’re wondering why Bengal’s political violence should matter to you, here’s why: it shows how democratic processes can be hollowed out from within. It’s not about stolen ballots. It’s about turning participation into coercion.
When violence becomes the currency of power, elections become mere rituals. Political parties outsource coercion. Citizens outsource justice. And democracy loses its meaning.
The Warning Signs Are National
Bengal may be the most visible, but it's not an outlier. Similar patterns are emerging across India—from caste-based militia in Uttar Pradesh to communal tensions in Delhi’s fringe districts.
What’s happening in Bengal is not just regional chaos. It’s a national omen.
Final Takeaway: Don’t Call It Chaos. Call It a System.
Political violence in Bengal is not random. It’s structured, layered, and shockingly resilient. Its agents are not fringe elements; they are deeply embedded in the economic and political fabric of the state.
And the most chilling part? It adapts. Like a virus, it mutates from ideology to economy to identity.
We need to stop seeing these as isolated incidents. They are symptoms of a system. And unless that system is diagnosed and dismantled, we risk normalizing the abnormal—across India.
Suman Nath is a political anthropologist and the author of “The Production of Political Violence,” published in the Journal for the Study of Radicalism. For the original piece click here
References:
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Michelutti, Lucia, et al. (2019). Mafia Raj: The Rule of Bosses in South Asia. Stanford University Press. https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=30961
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Ruud, Arild Engelsen (2010). “Uncivil Politics: Communal Violence and the 'Strongman' in Bangladesh.” In Forum for Development Studies, 37(1). https://doi.org/10.1080/08039410903524783
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Brass, Paul R. (2005). The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India. University of Washington Press. https://uwapress.uw.edu/book/9780295744115/the-production-of-hindu-muslim-violence-in-contemporary-india/
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Wilkinson, Steven I. (2006). Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511617114
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