Why Political Violence in Bengal Refuses to Die — And What It Says About India’s Democracy

Source: Click here

From the Maoist-hit jungles of Junglemahal to the burning streets of riot-torn suburbs, West Bengal has been India’s laboratory of political violence for decades. But here’s the twist: it’s not just about politics. It’s about jobs. It’s about power. It’s about becoming someone in a world that offers little else.

Violence in Bengal doesn’t just erupt—it’s manufactured, curated, and circulated through what I call a “fluid machinery of violence.” And no, this isn't about random street fights. This is ethnographic evidence of how violence becomes an alternative career path, how thugs turn into protectors, and how democracy is gamed from the grassroots up.

For over 15 years, I’ve conducted multisite, longitudinal ethnographic research in some of Bengal’s most volatile districts. What I found is disturbing: the same people who once fought Maoists in tribal belts are now fighting Muslims in working-class towns. The faces change. The uniforms change. The script does not.

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From Red Flags to Ram Navami: The Shapeshifting of Violence

In 2008, the forests of West Bengal were on fire—figuratively and literally. Armed Maoists were killing politicians, and the state retaliated with “village militias” like the Gram Shanti Raksha Bahini (Village Peace-Keeping Force). These vigilante groups were born out of fear but morphed into a formidable network of enforcers.

But the real shift came when these so-called protectors turned predators. Political camps set up to counter Maoists became violent nodes of state-backed militia. Young men, displaced or desperate, joined these camps for shelter, food, and a gun. By 2011, this spiral of violence exploded in Netai, where CPIM-linked gunmen fired indiscriminately on villagers, killing nine.

It was the end of one regime—and the birth of another.

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Farming, Cold Storages, and the Economics of Fear

You thought agriculture was peaceful? Think again.

In places like Bardhaman, political violence is intricately linked to the rural economy. Cold storages, rice mills, and “potato bonds” (yes, they exist) are controlled by middlemen who owe their power to political parties. When the ruling party changes, so does the mafia.

Here, violence isn't ideological—it’s transactional. It decides who gets irrigation, who gets to sell potatoes, and who gets beaten up for supporting the “wrong” party. It’s a mafia-like oligarchy, and each tier—from investors to local goons—has a role.

So, when we say "free market" in rural Bengal, it's not just about prices. It's about muscle.

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Ram Navami, Muharram, and the Rise of Identity Wars

Since 2013, another form of violence has surged—low-intensity communal riots. From Canning and Kaliachak to Chandannagar and Asansol, Bengal has seen increasing skirmishes during Hindu and Muslim festivals.

What’s different now is the scripted spontaneity. Whether it's a Facebook post or a procession route dispute, the spark is almost always lit in a deeply polarized, misinformation-laden public sphere. And who fans the flame? Professional goons, local party cadres, and politically connected businesspeople.

These aren’t accidental mobs. They’re actors in a well-rehearsed drama where Ram Navami sword rallies and Islamic Jalsas serve as political theatre.

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Anatomy of a Riot: The Four-Layered Pyramid of Violence

What makes these incidents more than just “law and order” failures is the structure behind them. Based on my fieldwork, political violence in Bengal operates through a four-tiered machinery:

1. Core Group: Mid-level political leaders and economic elites who plan the violence.

2. Professionals: Hired muscle—willing to switch sides if the price is right.

3. Opportunists: Local party workers who loot and burn for reward or recognition.

4. The Public Sphere: Regular citizens radicalized through social media and community whispers.

These layers are porous and constantly in flux. Today’s volunteer becomes tomorrow’s leader. Yesterday’s criminal becomes today’s hero.

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Violence as a Job, a Role, a Performance

The most alarming discovery from my research? Violence has become a career path. In areas with few employment opportunities, becoming a party tough or a religious enforcer is not just tolerated—it’s respected.

They are the local dadas, the ones who “get things done.” And in the absence of formal authority, they become the law.

In this sense, West Bengal doesn’t just have political violence—it has institutionalized violence. And it's not unique. As studies in South Asia show, from Bangladesh’s student riots to India’s communal clashes, violence increasingly functions as a resource strategy rather than an ideological war (Michelutti et al., 2019).

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Why It Matters for India’s Democracy

If you’re wondering why Bengal’s political violence should matter to you, here’s why: it shows how democratic processes can be hollowed out from within. It’s not about stolen ballots. It’s about turning participation into coercion.

When violence becomes the currency of power, elections become mere rituals. Political parties outsource coercion. Citizens outsource justice. And democracy loses its meaning.

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The Warning Signs Are National

Bengal may be the most visible, but it's not an outlier. Similar patterns are emerging across India—from caste-based militia in Uttar Pradesh to communal tensions in Delhi’s fringe districts.

What’s happening in Bengal is not just regional chaos. It’s a national omen.

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Final Takeaway: Don’t Call It Chaos. Call It a System.

Political violence in Bengal is not random. It’s structured, layered, and shockingly resilient. Its agents are not fringe elements; they are deeply embedded in the economic and political fabric of the state.

And the most chilling part? It adapts. Like a virus, it mutates from ideology to economy to identity.

We need to stop seeing these as isolated incidents. They are symptoms of a system. And unless that system is diagnosed and dismantled, we risk normalizing the abnormal—across India.

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Suman Nath is a political anthropologist and the author of “The Production of Political Violence,” published in the Journal for the Study of Radicalism. For the original piece click here

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References:

• Michelutti, Lucia, et al. (2019). Mafia Raj: The Rule of Bosses in South Asia. Stanford University Press. https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=30961

• Ruud, Arild Engelsen (2010). “Uncivil Politics: Communal Violence and the 'Strongman' in Bangladesh.” In Forum for Development Studies, 37(1). https://doi.org/10.1080/08039410903524783

• Brass, Paul R. (2005). The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India. University of Washington Press. https://uwapress.uw.edu/book/9780295744115/the-production-of-hindu-muslim-violence-in-contemporary-india/

• Wilkinson, Steven I. (2006). Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511617114

The Semiotics of Aggression: When 'Gali' Becomes a Political Weapon, the case of Anubrata

Suman Nath 

Mural painted by women in Zone 18, one of the most violent neighbourhoods in Guatemala City April 2018. Part of Safe Cities Programme Guatemala UN Women/Ryan Brown

On May 30, 2024, a four-minute audio clip surfaced, allegedly capturing Mondal using derogatory and abusive language, including threats of sexual violence, against Bolpur’s Inspector-in-Charge (IC), Subrata Halder, and his family. (https://www.telegraphindia.com/west-bengal/anubrata-mondal-skips-police-summons-citing-health-issues-but-visits-tmc-party-office-prnt/cid/2105480). This is not an isolated event, nor it is a matter of poor etiquette or a momentary lapse of judgment; it's a calculated strategy, deeply embedded in the political culture, particularly at the regional level. The pervasive use of verbal abuse by political leaders, even against state functionaries like the police, is a symptom of deeper political, social, and cultural dynamics that demand critical examination.

'Gaali': The Unfiltered Language of Power

To truly grasp the phenomenon, one must understand 'Gali' (गाली) – abusive language, expletives, or profanities in the Indian context.  https://www.suppresspress.com/book/language-and-symbolic-power]. Anthropologist Lawrence Cohen describes gaali as a performative act embedded in cultural power dynamics, particularly in masculine and political spheres [Cohen, 1995, Holi in Banaras] [https://doi.org/10.1215/10642684-2-4-399]. Gaali, deeply intertwined with power dynamics, operates as a form of symbolic violence that maintains existing structures through humiliation and fear [https://www.suppresspress.com/book/language-and-symbolic-power]. Its often masculine nature and role in projecting patriarchal authority are illuminated by R.W. Connell's theory of hegemonic masculinity [https://www.politybooks.com/bookdetail/?isbn=9780745634265]. Beyond individual interactions, gaali functions within broader political systems; Kanchan Chandra's patronage democracy highlights its integration into clientelist networks [https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/why-ethnic-parties-succeed/9780521814525]. The impact of gaali is significantly amplified through communication channels, a concept underscored by Marshall McLuhan's media theory [https://mitpress.edu/9780262631594/]. Furthermore, gaali serves as a tool for collective action and political maneuvering; Charles Tilly's social movement theory frames it as a mobilization tactic [https://www.routledge.com/Social-Movements-1768-2004/Tilly/p/book/9781594510434], while George Tsebelis's game theory interprets it as a strategic signal within competitive political landscapes [https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520066779/nested-games]. These frameworks contextualize Mondal’s actions within West Bengal’s socio-political culture and India’s broader dynamics.

Clearly 'Gaali' is far more than just an insult; it's a potent social and cultural tool. While it can be playful among peers, in the political arena, it transforms into a powerful instrument for expressing anger, frustration, or, most critically, asserting dominance [Kaviraj, Sudipta. "Filth and the Public Sphere: Concepts and Practices about Space in Calcutta" (https://shekhar.cc/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/kaviraj.pdf)]. In certain social circles, the ability to deliver a 'Gaali' effectively can even be seen as a sign of strength, authenticity, or a defiant rejection of perceived elitism.

When a political figure deploys 'Gaali', it's a deliberate transgression of formal norms. It signals a willingness to operate outside conventional boundaries, connecting with a raw, unfiltered public sentiment. This makes it a powerful, albeit transgressive, tool in the political lexicon, capable of eliciting strong emotional responses and shaping perceptions of power and authority [The Wire, May 13, 2025 (https://m.thewire.in/article/rights/india-online-trolling-rightwing-doxxing-vikram-misri); It’s the language of the street brought into the hallowed halls of power, designed to resonate with a specific, often marginalized, segment of the population along with the followers, who are often tasked with exercising dominance through violence.

The Iron Fist of Political Control

One of the most immediate and impactful reasons for political leaders to resort to verbal abuse is to overtly exercise and demonstrate political contro through violencel. By publicly intimidating opponents, critics, and even administrative officials like the police, these leaders send an unmistakable signal of their unchallenged authority and their readiness to transgress established norms [The Telegraph India, June 1, 2025 (https://www.telegraphindia.com/west-bengal/anubrata-mondal-skips-police-summons-citing-health-issues-but-visits-tmc-party-office-prnt/cid/2105480)]. This aggressive posturing creates an environment where dissent is stifled, and compliance is implicitly or explicitly enforced. When a political figure abuses a police officer without immediate, severe repercussions, it broadcasts a clear message about the power hierarchy. There are triple underlying obligatory meanings attached, to become someone of supreme authority in both tradition and legal-institutitional forms, to be able to operate with impunity that undermining the authority of state institutions, and to be able to normalise violence [The Telegraph India, June 1, 2025 (https://www.telegraphindia.com/west-bengal/anubrata-mondal-skips-police-summons-citing-health-issues-but-visits-tmc-party-office-prnt/cid/2105480); Times of India, June 1, 2025 (https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/kolkata/anubrata-cites-ill-health-to-skip-cop-call-police-issue-2nd-summons/articleshow/121542120.cms)]. Such Gaali by political bosses isn't merely an outburst of anger; it's a calculated performance designed to establish dominance and reinforce the leader's position at the apex of the local power structure. It showcases a capacity to bend or break rules, thereby asserting a form of extra-legal authority that proves highly effective in maintaining control over both party cadres and the local administration [(https://ijirl.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/POLITICAL-VIOLENCE-IN-WEST-BENGAL-A-COMPARATIVE-ANALYSIS-OF-DIFFERENT-STATES-OF-INDIA.pdf)].

Masculinity: The 'Strongman' Persona

Gaali when seen in broader context projects hegemonic masculinity in West Bengal. Mondal’s 2024 audio, with slurs against Halder’s wife and mother, crafted a “mafia don” persona resonating with rural supporters who equate aggression with strength. This aligns with Connell’s theory, where toughness reinforces patriarchal authority [https://www.politybooks.com/bookdetail?book_slug=masculinities-2nd-edition--9780745634265 ]. Mondal’s role in projects like Deocha-Pachami coal mine bolstered his rugged image. His 2018 threats against police also reflect this masculinity. Filippo Osella’s work supports this, noting gali’s role in gendered hierarchies [Osella, 2004, Men and Masculinities in South India].

However, Mr. Mondal is not alone, the aggressive, often vulgar, language employed by several Indian political leaders incluidng the top ranking ones is deeply intertwined with a specific performance of masculinity. Across many parts of India, particularly in local politics, the "strongman" archetype holds significant sway [Taylor & Francis Online https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14608944.2024.2421009?af=R]. The strongman leaders are then seen as fearless, decisive, and unafraid to use unconventional or even aggressive methods to achieve their objectives. In this context, verbal abuse becomes a performative act of hyper-masculinity, signalling virility, toughness, and an unwavering resolve. It aligns with traditional notions of power where overt displays of dominance and a willingness to confront are highly valued [https://doras.dcu.ie/29387/]. This "macho" image resonates powerfully with a populace that often equates strength with effective leadership, especially in contexts where political power is seen as the key to navigating complex social realities and securing vital resources. The leader who employs 'Gaali' and aggressive rhetoric might be perceived as someone who "gets things done," who is not afraid to challenge authority (even if it's the state's own authority), and who embodies a raw, unrefined power that is seen as more authentic than the polished discourse of elite politicians [Taylor & Francis Online (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14608944.2024.2421009?af=R)]. This performance of masculinity is a deliberate strategy to cultivate a loyal following and to project an image of unyielding power that intimidates rivals and assures supporters.

The 'Rowdy' Populist Appeal

Adopting a "rowdy" or unconventional approach, frequently characterized by Gaali, is also a deliberate populist strategy. By eschewing formal language and embracing the vernacular of the streets, leaders aim to differentiate themselves from the perceived "elite" or "gentleman" politicians. This approach cultivates an image of authenticity and relatability, presenting the leader as "one of them" – someone who understands and speaks the language of the common people, unburdened by the niceties of high politics [(https://mcrg.in/populism-populist-politics-concept-note/)].

This populist appeal is particularly effective in mobilizing support from segments of the electorate who may feel marginalized or alienated by traditional political discourse. The "rowdy" leader is seen as unpretentious, direct, and willing to fight for the interests of their constituents without bureaucratic circumlocution. This rejection of political decorum can be interpreted as a sign of genuine commitment to the masses, fostering a sense of solidarity and trust. It taps into a popular sentiment that often views formal institutions and their representatives with suspicion, preferring a leader who embodies a more direct, confrontational style [http://www.mcrg.ac.in/PP138.pdf)].

Inflammatory and abusive language serves as an incredibly powerful rallying cry for party cadres and supporters. Its emotional impact is undeniable: it can generate excitement, foster a sense of collective anger against political opponents, and solidify a shared identity and purpose among followers. When a leader uses strong, often transgressive, language, it creates a visceral "us-versus-them" dynamic, intensifying loyalty and energizing the base.

Verbal Abuse as a Precursor to Violence

The connection between verbal abuse and the threat or actual exercise of violence is often subtle, yet profoundly significant. Verbal aggression can serve as a direct precursor to physical coercion, cultivating an atmosphere of fear and intimidation that can, and often does, escalate into actual violence. When a leader employs abusive language, especially direct threats, it signals a clear willingness to resort to more extreme measures if their demands are not met. This implicit threat of violence can be highly effective in compelling compliance from individuals and institutions.

In political contexts, particularly in regions with a history of political violence like West Bengal, such language can unfortunately normalize aggression and lower the threshold for physical confrontation. It desensitizes both perpetrators and potential victims to the severity of violent acts, making them appear as a natural, albeit regrettable, extension of intense political rivalry. The public display of verbal aggression by leaders can embolden party workers to engage in similar behavior, secure in the knowledge that their actions are implicitly sanctioned by the leadership. This creates a dangerous cycle where verbal abuse not only intimidates but also paves the way for the actual exercise of political violence, severely impacting the democratic fabric and the rule of law [The Wire, May 13, 2025 (https://m.thewire.in/article/rights/india-online-trolling-rightwing-doxxing-vikram-misri)].

The Broader Context: Weak Institutions and Media Amplification

Beyond these core strategic and cultural drivers, several other factors contribute to the pervasive nature of verbal abuse in Indian politics. A perceived lack of stringent and swift legal action against political leaders who engage in verbal abuse often emboldens them to continue such behavior [(https://www.telegraphindia.com/west-bengal/anubrata-mondal-skips-police-summons-citing-health-issues-but-visits-tmc-party-office-prnt/cid/2105480); When institutions, including the police and judiciary, are seen as susceptible to political pressure, the deterrent effect of laws against abusive language diminishes significantly.

Furthermore, the widespread dissemination of audio and video clips of leaders using abusive language, often amplified by social media and news channels, can normalize such behavior. Even if the intention may be to expose, it can also provide these leaders with a wider platform, contributing to the perception that this is an acceptable, albeit controversial, part of political discourse (https://m.thewire.in/article/rights/india-online-trolling-rightwing-doxxing-vikram-misri)]. West Bengal, in particular, with its long history of intense political rivalry and street politics, has a deeply ingrained culture of confrontation. This historical context often fosters an environment where aggressive language is not only tolerated but sometimes even expected as a sign of political strength. Lastly, in regions marked by significant socio-economic disparities and intense competition for resources, political power often translates directly into patronage and control. Leaders who project an image of unyielding power, even through abusive language, might be seen as more effective in securing benefits for their constituents.

A Call for Reflection

The phenomenon of political leaders employing verbal abuse, as starkly exemplified by cases like Anubrata Mondal, is a complex and multifaceted issue. It is rooted in a confluence of political strategy, deeply ingrained cultural norms, and raw power dynamics. It is far from a mere lapse in decorum; it is a deliberate, and often effective, tool for exercising control, performing a specific type of masculinity, adopting a populist "rowdy" persona, mobilizing followers, and implicitly or explicitly threatening violence. The indigenous concept of 'Gali' provides a crucial cultural lens through which to understand the deeper resonance and performative power of such language in the Indian context.

While democratic discourse ideally thrives on reasoned debate and mutual respect, the reality on the ground in India often deviates significantly. The normalization of verbal aggression by political leaders poses a serious challenge to the health of democratic institutions, eroding public trust in the rule of law and fostering an environment where intimidation can supersede dialogue. Addressing this critical issue requires not only robust legal and institutional reforms but also a deeper societal reflection on the values that truly underpin political leadership and public discourse in India.

The author is an anthropologist.

From Violence to Silence: The Curious Case of Bhatpara, West Bengal by Suman Nath

 

West Bengal has developed several communally charged hotspots since 2015. Aggressive Ram Navami rallies are the primary mechanisms for the Hindutva organisations to cultivate the Hindutva sentiments in these regions. Kankinara-Bhatpara region of North 24 parganas district is one of such places. While the conflict started as early as 2017 when the collective of Hindutva organisations under RSS brought out a Ram Navami rally. The communal ambiance was quickly handled because of prompt police action. In 2018 there was a large-scale riot between the Hindus and Muslims that resulted in death of several civilians and the sub-urban railway network was interrupted for weeks. The local Member of Assembly Mr. Arjun Singh's change of political affiliation from Trinamool Congress to Bharatiya Janta Party added further vibrance to the ethno-political landscape of the region. Hurling of bombs, sound of gunshot and regular conflicts kept Bengali newspapers busy reporting Bhatpara. Aamra ek sachetan Prayas forum, an organisation which studies conflict and peace in India, did a comprehensive study on the nature of conflicts and published a ground report (https://aamrabharatbarsha.com/welcome/singlepost/bhatpara-violence-fact-finding-report) which shows a mix of local politics and declining jute industries to be the prime mover of Bhatpara becoming a communal hotbed. Aamra has formed a peace centre among the riot victims in Bhatpara to bring about positive changes there, especially among the children. Because of several communal incidents, Bhatpara has been a focus of attention during the Ram temple inauguration on January 22, 2024. Contrary to what Bhatpara has experience since 2018, it was rather peaceful. It is important to understand the factors that brought back peace in an otherwise hotbed of communally charged landscape.

 
The setting:

 

Bhatpara is located on the eastern bank of river hooghly, it belongs to one of the places where jute industries were established during the British period which flourished enough to attract workers from different corners of the country (https://www.jstor.org/stable/20078659). They were then settled in the prosperous labour colonies and officers quarters (https://www.jstor.org/stable/141708). With the steady decline of Jute industry once prosperous colonies have become shanties (https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315098975-9/mill-sirens-rang-danger-anna-sailer). A journey through the river touching places like Kankinara-Bhatpara, Telinipara, Naihati would show series of jute mills and related labour colonies. The labour colony settlers have been here for three to five generations. Although, they have settled down in West Bengal, forming shanty campuses, these places have never assimilated with dominant Bengali language and customs. They speak Hindi or Urdu and are able to cling to their traditional customs and rituals. Their interface with Bengali speaking people has been of peaceful and tolerant.

 

In my ethnographic research at post-riot Bhatpara, I have found out rather natural co-existence between Hindus and Muslims. While the labour colonies have become ghettoised, as the next generation settlers have constructed shanties beside the existing labour quarters, there is hardly any option to avoid everyday physical contact between Hindus and Muslims. The adjacent makeshift shanties inhabited by Hindus and Muslims have co-operated each others in their everyday life ranging from food sharing to handling a nagging kid. The community latrines and common bathing place have added to such interdependence. I found that a small open space in Tina-gudam area was being used by both Hindus and Muslims everyday. While there was a large cut-out of lord Ram, Muslims were preparing for the celebration of Eid at the same ground. Yet, 2018 onwards a deep division between the Hindus and Muslims characterised this place (https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9781003273516-6/fundamentalists-meet-suman-nath). There were even reports of kids of different faiths sitting separately in local schools. In 2020, just opposite side of Hooghly, another riot broke in Telinipara-Chandannagar which made this region even more prominent locale for the cultivation of communal sentiments (https://aamrabharatbarsha.com/welcome/singlepost/%E0%A6%A4%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%B2%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%A8%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%AA%E0%A6%BE%E0%A7%9C%E0%A6%BE-%E0%A6%A4%E0%A6%A5%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%AF%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%A8%E0%A7%81%E0%A6%B8%E0%A6%A8%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%A7%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%A8-%E0%A6%AA%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%B0%E0%A6%A4%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%AC%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%A6%E0%A6%A8-%E0%A7%A8%E0%A7%A6%E0%A7%A8%E0%A7%A6)

 

The political economy:

 

While in my book I wrote extensively on the political economic equation which existed in Bhatpara during Arjun Sing's switch over and the Mafia culture which predominated the area (https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003273516/democracy-social-cleavage-india-suman-nath?refId=8d19e283-3cba-4c4c-a6e1-f1de36cc8840&context=ubx), the situation has changed over the years. For now, controlling the labours, making more contractual labourers than the permanent ones is aided with land related business which involves promoting and buying and selling of lands for profits. Mr Sing's political adventure with BJP in 2019 when he won the Barrackpore Parliamentary constituency as a BJP candidate was not viable in local political economic equations. First of all, his Muslim support base was gone, Hindutva sentiment could only earn him a popular mandate against ruling TMC, but, such popular support was already with him since 2001. He won for four times in Bhatpara Assembly Constituency, hence, aggressive Hindutva didnt earn him any extra milege; secondly, his political-economic machinery couldn't operate like it used to be. The local police administration gone out of his control. Even his house was attacked more than once and even being a Member of Parliament he couldn't save his home from party goons (https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/kolkata/bjp-mp-arjun-singhs-house-in-west-bengal-attacked-with-crude-bombs-7495935/).

 

As Arjun Singh rejoined TMC in May 2022 (https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/kolkata/arjun-singh-joins-trinamool-congress-7930470/) thereby restoring the local political-economic equations once again. Meanwhile, some of his followers who were allegedly directly involved in the riots and have allegedly worked actively in dismantling some of the Muslim predominated labour colonies were also not in a position to work freely until the local political equation was settled down. Since 2022, slowly the tension between the two communities have reduced to a significant extent, which is directly connected to the political stability.

 

The deafening silence of the aggressive Hindutva:

 

Does this mean that the Hindutva brigade have gone to the backfoot? There has been a continuation and further proliferation of RSS run fitness camps, mock sword fight and not to forget the grand Ram Navami celebrations (https://www.ijcv.org/index.php/ijcv/article/view/3119). RSS has been successful to set the template for the politics in Bhatpara and its adjacent regions.

 

One recent example is the creation of 108 ft long ram portrait by the TMC leader Priyangu Pandey and his wife Jyoti Pandey (https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/kolkata/politics-religious-beliefs-different-things-tmc-man-who-made-108-ft-ram-portrait-9124780/). While Priyangu was internally scapegoated for 2018 Kankinara riot as he was involved in managing the TMC organised Ram Navami rally where Muslims were supposed to serve sharbat portraying Hindu-Muslim unity, post May 2022 he has emerged as a promising TMC leader with an ability to cater the rising demands of Hindutva. Another local TMC leader Gopal Raut, who was also allegedly involved in the riots have made a come back with popularity among both the Hindus and Muslims. On January 22, Both Priyangu and Gopal have organised camps for mass distribution of blankets to the poor. People belonging to both Hindu and Muslm communities have queued together when Grand Hindutva was celebrated by the BJP with firecrackers and lamps. Bhatpara region has seen several houses placing earthen lamps on the one hand and such queues were conspicuous on the other.

VHP organised programmes which were both less loud and smaller in scale; there was no use of DJ boxes with provocative aggressive Hindutva songs, which they played in 2018 both in Bhatpara and Asansol. The local police were also on high alert, shops were closed after 11:00 pm and local administration ensured that no crowed is formed in the night during the entire month of January 2024.

The relatively peaceful Bhatpara, shows the economic triumph over religious identity sentiments for the time being. It also indicates a strategic shift in approach of the Hindutva organisations at places like Bhatpara which has seen enough communal disturbances for more than five years now.

 

Suman Nath teaches anthropology at Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam Government College and is the author of the book “Democracy and Social Cleavage in India Ethnography of Riots, Everyday Politics and Communalism in West Bengal c. 2012–2021”

 

Unleashing the cruelty beneath the civilised souls: The Case of Lakhimpur Kheri

As we teach political science and anthropology, we often give examples of brutal genocides. One example is that of the fight between Maori and Moriori in November-December 1835 when a ship full of Maori arrived on Chatham Islands, 500 miles east of New Zealand to kill, cook and eat the Moraroi people and enslave those who were alive. This brutality is based on technological difference, as Maori had guns, clubs and axes, while Morari had only rudimentary hunting and gathering technology at their disposals without any experience of warfare was an easy prey. Because of the lack of technology and centralised leadership the Moraroi also didn’t have strong leadership. Similarly, we can also recollect the story of Fayu tribe of New Guinea who because of proper conflict resolution mechanism have ended up killing each other for trivial reasons. At one point of time they had a population of about 2000 but because of killing each other their population dropped significantly. This happened because they lacked political and social mechanisms that we take for granted everyday.

It would be premature to conclude that ‘proper’ political organisation is ‘essential’ for human survival as we have seen other band societies doing well without these organisations, especially in Saharan Africa, but needless to mention that a complex state society needs them to function and grow. We can look at the recent disturbing visuals that surfaced at the Lakhimpur Kheri, where it is seen that a speeding SUV car, allegedly driven/owned/inspired by a Minister of State, Mr. Ajay Mishra Teni’s son have ploughed through the protesting farmers relating anecdotes just given above. What count’s for such a violent act to crush people who at least as the video show showed no provocation?

There is a broad spectrum of this form of violence which is ontologically different from political murder and killings that we have witnessed about a decade ago. We have witnessed oppositions being killed, Maoists targeting ruling regimes at places like West Bengal, but killing protesters in broad day light is a machinery that needs to be explored.

First of all, there has been a long-drawn provocation and construction of us/them boundary. This possibly began with the use of neologism like #Tukde_Tukde_Gang, #Urban_Naxal which targeted the student union leaders. Especially those who desist Hindutva and its monolithic constructions. Killing however, was not uncommon as we have seen in the case of Gauri Lankesh. The provocation continued.  The construction of Us/them dichotomy apart from using the neologisms that we have just mentioned, have regularly worked along the existing identity fault-lines. This spilled over towards the defamation of any dissent by linking them with a) external influence of Pakistan or Khalistani movement, and b) The Hindu-Muslim divide, even in the cloths that people wear. Such strong us-them divide didn’t even spare the covid-19 which got promoted through other sets of neologisms like #Corona_Jihad.

While, the mainstream and yet divisive media has promoted us-them dichotomy, the online platforms have been used by the IT-Cell machinery to make these divisions as part of everyday living. Over a few years, India has been able to produce a public-sphere which is unemployed, aimless and with heart full of hatred against Muslims, Students, Protesting farmers and anyone who makes a noise. Meanwhile, round the year incidents of cattle-linked lynching frequently ‘inspired’ by the inactive or hyperactive police administration have created a sense of recklessness among those who form the majoritarian sentiment of the country. We have witnessed how leaders have inspired riots in front of administration.

India, is now walking along with hundreds of ‘Maori’ people armed with hatred and organised in a variety of names, be it the Gawrakshaks, or the Jamatis. As we have successfully taught people to carefully hate ‘the others’, the us/them division now see each other as less human and therefore expendable. Clearly, a combination of hatred, fearlessness because of possible administrative and political support is deadly, and Indians are a few steps away from becoming the ‘Fayu’ who killed each other because of lack of mechanisms of conflict resolution mechanisms. In our case, our machineries are failing. The post-violence internet ban, arresting of opposition leadership is symptomatic to such a disorder and chaos. 

Pic Credit: BBC

THE GRAND DESIGN: Five Striking Similarities between Delhi and West Bengal Riots

Delhi shows India's new direction. An election defeat of the Bharatiya Janata Party which tried its best polarise the electorate. It gives two important lessions, first, service delivery pays and second, polarisation is not always secures electoral dividend. However, the North East Delhi riot which began in 23rd February is indicative to the heavy price that people need to pay in name of politics.  Its extremely difficult to write or to know the reality through the news reports in India. More so, because the one sided accentuation of the news channels. News doesn't display what is happening but display perspectives and the public sphere can then decide on which one to follow to form their own opinions and participate in a debate. It happens to be the worst kind of a situation where no matter how hard you try, its extremely difficult to stand on your ground based on the information you are getting. I have been relying on a particular news channel NDTV partly because it poses critical questions without getting emotional about it and partly because it still delivers a lot of contents.

However, a relatively more powerful tool which I use is ethnography. Along with my like minded friends at AAMRA ek Sachetan Prayas Forum, I am conducting ethnographic research on the issues such as political violence, grassroots politics for over a decade now. However, his experience is relatively confined mostly to my home state of West Bengal. Because I do not have the fund or am not allowed to go on long vacation for conducting fieldwork in other parts of the country. While, I was closely following the communal riots in my own state through ethnography, I am taking a close look at Delhi incident through news channels mostly by NDTV and through a particular news paper The telegraph.

My reading and field experience reveals a striking similarity in "Manufacturing the polarisation" in West Bengal and also recently in Delhi

Let us see the design of such a manufacture.

A. The Construction of Others:

It is seen that there are different 'successful' mechanisms to construct the "us/them" boundary, or rejuvenate such boundary principals. It is partly based the primordial identity sentiments stemmed from 'different' cultural practices and partition memory and party based on newly founded hoaxes like Hindurashtra, Ghusbethiya (Infiltrators), Job eaters, illegitimate occupants (person who is not supposed to live here, because of some weird reason ranging from having skull-cap to participating in a particular rallies). Because, a section of public intellectuals have actually supported the cause of such 'others' they are also branded as others in innovative connotations like 'urban naxal', 'anti-nationals.'   

Once such connotation/category is widely popularised it becomes a portable tool to identify a wide section of the populace to be confronted with. So, now you have a handy device to construct the 'other' through the degree or extent of their otherness and then based on the available resources you can decide on what can be done on the other. Such actions range from online bullying to murder (remember Gauri Lankesh), from lynching to riot. 

Accordingly, in order to operationalise the grand scheme you need resources. 

B. The Resources:

Although, there is an attempt in each of the riots that has taken place in West Bengal to project them as a spontaneous outcome of the hatred (Dhulagarh), religious procession (Asansol, Naihati-Hajinagar), or viral facebook post (Baduria-Basirhat), in each of the interveiws people commonly expressed that there were 'outsiders' and there were 'insiders' explaining the 'geography' to them. The outsiders are the organised forces that successfully conduct the riots both in Bengal and now as it appears from several direct responses by the citizens, in Delhi as well. See the Prime-Time news cover by Ravish Kumar on 27.02.2020 on Delhi riot. Especially at the section where his team finds out the people who saved each others and common people who mentioned the presence of the outsiders. 

The contention becomes even clearer as one gets to know that country-made guns and other weapons entered Delhi from Western Uttar Pradesh (https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/delhi-violence-countrymade-guns-from-west-up-weapons-of-all-shapes-used-in-riots/story-uVOk0GaAkHZCj7UHox8C3M.html)

Although I have limited understanding of the nature of these goons and their mode of operation, I have however interviewed a section of goons like this during the end of Left Politics in West Bengal, when there were armed mercenaries (popularly Harmad) were posted in different villages in the forested districts of West Bengal. These are a section of uneducated, unemployable, notorious youths. Who are usually ready to do anything in exchange of money, liquor and women. You have them they are yours. I failed to see any ideological orientation of these goons, but yes they had a hatred towards the Maoists. That partly because they were supposed to fight them and partly because they were rejected by the villagers many of whom actually had sympathies towards the Maoists. 

There is a rough similarities between the goons that I had encountered in my fieldwork about ten years ago and now. They are young, notorious and has little care for social order or any sort of ethical principles. 

Who are they? 

Trust me, they are not alien from a different planet. They are living among us. You might have encountered one of them today while crossing the road or buying vegetable from the local shop. You might have seen him in the underconstructed apparent in your neighbourhood. 

They are specialists, specialised in rootlessness, uselessness and lack of baggages (familial, local or ideological).

C. Use of Resources:

What happens when you can connect the otherness with the resources to be used in annihilation? Delhi is a perfect example of such a connect. Its an organised move towards such annihilation. The goons we are watching on television screen, forwarded through our whatsapp and facebook videos are the outcome of what happens when such a connection is established. Shaheen bagh protest model which was a kindle to an otherwise darkness engulfed country has been systematically targeted by the administrative mechanisms, in different ways. First, during the Delhi election Shaheen Bagh protest has been shown as the reason for choking of Delhi traffic. Common people ranging from Auto drivers to workers made to feel disgusted as the popular narrative of sad traffic condition due to the protest was floated. Meanwhile reports (Click here) have come that there are alternative roads which could help traffic go smoothly but not allowed to be opened. The image below is an example.

If Shaheen Bagh protest was a positive hope for many, the regressive righ wingers easily projected it to be a threat towards Hindu majority and that Muslims are going high-handed. Following is a list of four such hatespeeches on record which the Delhi High Court played and ordered FIR against all such hatespeeches been delivered.

Even after a defeat in the Delhi Assembly, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) continued to spill the hate mongering, inspiring its followers to become more aggressive.

Such aggressive hatespeeches do have consequences. In each of the riots that has happened in West Bengal, there is a significant presence of hatespeech delivered by people occupying the positions of power. In Baduria-Basirhat, there were instances of hatespeech delivery by locally influencial leaders. People alleged a cross border influence, as they have heard that there were instances of hatespeech delivered from Mosques located on the other side of the river Ichhamati, however, during the riot there were instances of hatespeech. Similarly, in Rejinagar, Murshidabad the attack on Pir-panths by the Sharia panths was organised and channelised by the local Mosques through hatespeech. Apart from that, the rallies, filled with competing politico-communal forces are always mutually exclusive and echoed with hatespeech that often resulted in the violence, like what has happened in Asansol-Ranigunj and the dynamics of Ram Navami celebration.

d. The Geography of violence:   

There is a geographic feature of the Delhi violence which is roughly parallel to what happened in many places in West Bengal in recent past. The following image (by National Herald) clearly reflects the violence has a connection with the borders of the Uttar Pradesh and are the pockets where 'incidentally' BJP has the majority.

When I was conducting fieldwork on the communal violence in West Bengal a geographical feature was notable in several cases. For example in Naihati-Hajinagar which was one local teachers mentioned "mini-India" because of its population dynamics. With the Jute-mill concentration these are the places where people all over the India has immigrated and eventually settled down. There is a high concentration of so called 'hindi belt' population as well. Same is the case with Kankinara-Bhatpara where the politico-religious conflict continued for months before, during and after the Parliamentary election. Once one reaches there one can easily see the compressed co-existence of Hindu-Muslim living with extremely inhuman condition. The community toilet doesnt have privacy and people are supposed to excrete openly in a confined place one of which once blasted killing three. The community bathing system will remind you of a concentration camp and filthy drainage will not let you have your meal properly. Yet, instead of raising voices against such exploitation which is continuing since the British period they keep on fighting an impossible Hindu-Muslim battle. The communal upsurge in Delhi has happened in places which roughly correspond to the geography in Bengal where construction of identity fault line is relatively easier.

Hence, in such places in Bengal has seen a sudden upsurge in 'invented traditions' - performances which were never part of wide popular tradition in Bengal. The examples include Ganga Aarati in smaller scales and Ram Navami rallies in larger scale. These, along with numerous temple based organisations have formed a living display of political religion and brought back the identity issues in public discourse. Such pockets as Naihati-Hajinagar, Chandannagore, Dhulagarh, Baduria-Basirhat can reflect on the manufacturing polarisaiton in pockets of North-East Delhi.   

e. Administrative Delay:

In each of the cases in West Bengal, there was a great absence of administrative intervention. In each of the cases in West Bengal police reached at least two to three hours after the riot has started and then it took days for them to contend the situation. In some cases like Baduria-Basirhat the violence continued for months because it became unpredictable for the administration to even sense where the new violence might erupt. Meanwhile, shops are looted, and set ablaze, people are injured and killed. Delhi has shown worse form of administrative inaction. The Delhi Chief Minister Kejriwal demanded army intervention (click here) to contend the situation which only reflects the helplessness of the police administration in contending the situation.

In each of the cases in West Bengal wherever the riot expanded, it could expand primarily because of the delayed response from the administration. AAMRA in several cases has requested to interview the local police in order to know their response, but were always rejected by them. 

The ray of hope in otherwise gloomy situation is in Ravish Kumar's report which mentions several instances of communal harmony from within the residential colonies, which reinforces the designed nature of violence which shook the entire nation of a terror that has all probabilities to be unfolded at large scale. 

Cover Picture Credit: https://www.indiatoday.in/news-analysis/story/delhi-riots-just-10km-from-pmo-home-ministry-jafrabad-maujpur-burns-what-does-it-mean-1649911-2020-02-26