Existing corruption indices (CPI, BPI, GCB, WGI) by Transparency International offer a limited understanding due to their Westernized, quantitative nature. They fail to capture the situated, physical, and social realities of corruption. Defining corruption requires contextual specificity, as widely used phrases like "public power" and its "abuses" vary. Dreze and Sen (1996) describe third-world corruption as a combination of four factors, a) rent-seeking leaders, b) poor performance of public offices, c) distrust between state and society, and d) a development of public sector corruption culture. (https://global.oup.com/academic/product/india-economic-development-and-social-opportunity-9780198290124?cc=in&lang=en&#:~:text=This%20book%20argues%20that%20an,fields%2C%20Even%20the%20fostering%20of).
The outrage of teachers and police brutality against them (https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/kolkata/west-bengal-school-teachers-protesting-job-loss-lathi-charge-kolkata-police-9934566/) brings out public memories of atrocities under the erstwhile Left rule when violence at Singur, Nandigram and Junglemahal took place. While it is painful to see educated youth losing their jobs for no fault of their own, it is also the time to look at corruption in West Bengal at the broad spectrum. My longitudinal ethnographic research on TMC regime shows two intriguing and everyday issues of corruption as a prime mover of the state's informal (black?) political economy.
First, there is a development of service delivery transaction cost during TMC regime. It started with a shift from the Left Front's party-centric system to a leader-driven model. This strategy prioritises rapid service delivery, often facilitated by local strongmen, bypassing traditional bureaucratic channels. While this concentrates power, it accelerates service provisions. Despite frequent corrupt practices, the speed and assurance of delivery have garnered a public approval. This shift has effectively dismantled the LF's "party society," replacing it with a system reliant on individual leaders and their networks for efficient, albeit potentially corrupt, service access.
Second, consequently, there is an acceptance and normalisation of corruption as a necessary evil. Paying bribes (INR 10,000-15,000 for housing schemes, a percentage of MGNREGS wages for more work or the like) was generally accepted by people since as early as 2013-2014. This normalisation means people view corruption as part of their everyday interface with public service delivery institutions, hindering the opposition's ability to effectively use it as a campaign issue (https://www.epw.in/journal/2017/21/commentary/everyday-politics-and-corruption-west-bengal.html).
Alongside the rise of local level leader-centric public transaction, shifting itself from erstwhile party organisation resulted in a symbolic transfer of "Sarkar mai baap" (government as God) to "Neta mai baap" (leader as God). Such reflection is found everywhere, as one can see West Bengal is now full of posters and banners of local leaders. Their followers even print large billboards to wish their leaders "happy birthday." This portrayal of larger than life status of local leaders resonates well with Donmanship(https://www.dukeupress.edu/the-rule-of-dons) and Mafia Raj (https://www.sup.org/books/asian-studies/mafia-raj).
One has to situate two things here, first, at the bribe givers' end, we have a public sphere living with the larger than life leaders, and disciplining of corruption. Giving bribes to get something done is already normalised. TMC have successfully normalised petty and everyday corruptions like small bribes to police or local administration, to large scams, all of them are channelled through a retail system. Be it Sarada scam or the recruitment scam, TMC did it using their massive leader-driven clientelist machinery where in the process they could ensure the continuation of political patronage. Givers, takers and the implementing machinery, once entangled with the chain of command, are bound to ensure that the regime continues. Even if it is for a relatively small duration for the bribe givers, this system of corrupt exchange is long-term for those who are repeated participants.
It is in this context, that one needs to look at the normalisation and acceptance of retail forms of corruption in West Bengal. Firstly, corruption represents an informal market and follows market principles where everyone is attempting to maximise their individual interests, secondly, it opens up an avenue for livelihood opportunities for those who can pay or who can manage the cycle. This crosscuts every form of primordial identity boundaries.
West Bengal's political landscape reflects a shift to "Neta mai baap," with local leaders wielding immense power. Corruption, from petty bribes to large scams, is normalized, operating as an informal market. This system, fueled by clientelism, ensures regime continuity, creating a cycle of dependence and opportunity that transcends traditional social divisions. Whether the teachers' recruitment scam generates enough public outrage to alter political equation would depend on the opposition's use of this opportunity. While the Left has taken up the streets and is working relentlessly at the courtrooms for justice, BJP doesn't have much of a strong foundation as the present leader of opposition, Mr Adhikari has been associated with the TMC during this scam.
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